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Mahatma Gandhi once proclaimed “[e]arth provides enough to satisfy 
every man’s needs, but not every man’s greed.”
1
 With a population of 
approximately 330 million people
2
, a profound change to not only the 
natural resources of the United States but also the country’s natural 
landscape is inevitable. In January 1970, President Nixon signed the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) into law to “require federal 
agencies to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions prior 
to making decisions.”
3
 This landmark piece of legislation has guided man’s 
interactions with nature in the United States over the past fifty years. Early 
on however, a split arose amongst the circuits as to what remedies the 
                                                                                                             
  I would like to express my profound gratitude to the ONE-J Editorial Board for their 
guidance on this Note and especially to my faculty advisor, Professor M. Alexander Pearl, 
for helping me find clarity in the writing process.  
 1. Goodreads, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/30431-earth-provides-enough-to-
satisfy-every-man-s-needs-but-not (last visited January 18, 2021). 
 2. U.S. and World Population Clock, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited 
on Jan. 15, 2021). 
 3. EPA, What is the National Environmental Policy Act?, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/ 
what-national-environmental-policy-act (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
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courts may offer through judicial review to provide private individuals with 
relief over violations of the NEPA process by federal agencies.  
In 2019, through Lakes and Parks Alliance of Minneapolis (“LPA”),
4
 the 
Eighth Circuit followed not only circuit precedent but also cited judicial 
precedent in a majority of circuits to hold that prior to a “final agency 
action”
5
 there is “no [ ] adequate remedy in court.”
6
 Although this largely 
forecloses any cause of action against pre-mature, non-final federal agency 
actions that would “significantly affect[ ] the quality of the human 
environment”,
7
 and conflicts with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in 
Limehouse,
8
 it is overall the most optimal interpretation of rights under 
NEPA. That is, until adequate legislation is passed to promote additional 
substantive protections where NEPA is inapplicable and where other 
environmental statutes do not apply. Although the majority view in Lakes 
and Parks has its flaws, such as lack of substantive protection and potential 
conflict with other circuit opinions, the Eighth Circuit overall ruled 
correctly and has maintained the status quo of the NEPA process as well as 
the delicate industrial and environmental balance we hold as a nation. 
II. NEPA and the APA: How they work together 
Aside from standing, two primary statutory Acts are at play in the LPA 
case at the center of this article. NEPA, which lays out the procedural steps 
federal agencies are required to follow in carrying out “proposals for 
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment.”
9
 The Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) then acts as the vehicle which directs the process federal agencies 
utilize to pass regulations and also the procedure allowing courts to, 
plausibly, provide remedial measures to individuals who have faced “legal 
wrongs” due to agency action.
10
 
A. Standing in a NEPA action 
To begin, in order to have “standing” to bring suit in federal court, 
parties bringing a cause of action must commonly meet three elements set 
                                                                                                             
 4. Lakes and Parks All. of Minneapolis v. Fed. Transit Admin., 928 F.3d 759 (8th Cir. 
2019). 
 5. Id. at 762.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. at 761. 
 8. South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Limehouse, 549 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 9. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 72 (2004).  
 10. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (West 2020).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/6
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out in Article III of the Constitution.
11
 First a party must suffer an “‘injury 
in fact’ . . . which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or 
imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’”.
12
 “Second[ ] there must be a 
causal [and traceable] connection between the conduct . . . [and] the 
injury.”
13
 Third the injury complained of must be likely “redress[able] by a 
favorable decision.”
14
 Once standing is established, the real dynamic 
interplay between NEPA and the APA begins. 
B. NEPA: A guiding light to striking a balance between mankind and 
nature 
NEPA requires specific procedures take place for certain federal actions 
to occur, these procedures “require federal agencies to assess their 
environmental effects.”
15
 Agencies typically begin by drafting an 
“Environmental Assessment” (“EA”), which is a brief statement which the 
agency states, with supporting detail, whether the proposed action 
constitutes “major Federal action” and would require a more detailed report 
known as an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).
16
 If the agency 
determines that no EIS is necessary for their proposed action, i.e. it has not 
risen to a level of “major Federal action”, the agency must issue a report 
stating “why the proposed agency action will not have a significant impact 
on the human environment.”
17
 This report is known as a “finding of no 
significant impact” (“FONSI”).
18
 However, if the agency determines that 
the proposed action would constitute a “major Federal action”, which 
includes funding of projects by a federal agency,
19
 an EIS is required.
20
 The 
EIS report may be prepared by a state agency or official and presented to 
the federal agency for final approval.
21
 This EIS report must include 
information on “the environmental effect of the proposed action,” “any 
adverse environmental effects . . .,” “alternatives to the proposed action,” 
                                                                                                             
 11. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. at 561. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004). 
 17. Id. at 757–58. 
 18. Id. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D) (West 2020).  
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (West 2020).  
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(D) (West 2020).  
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and details on “any irrevocable and irretrievable commitments of 
resources . . . in the proposed action.”
22
  
Following the successful completion of an EIS by the state or federal 
agency seeking approval,
23
 or in some instances a supplementary EIS, the 
federal agency from which the approval is sought shall issue a “Record of 
Decision” (“ROD”).
24
 This ROD shall “[s]tate the decision”, “[i]dentify 
alternatives considered by the agency . . .”, and “[s]tate whether the agency 
has adopted all practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental harm 
from the alternative selected, and if not, why the agency did not.”
25
 There 
are further guidelines on the implementation of the EIS and the ROD; 
however they are inapplicable to the issue at hand within this note. Due to 
NEPA being widely viewed as strictly a “procedural” act, with no 
substantive rights attached by Congress,
26
 the only viable route to challenge 
violations is through the APA.
27
 Upon issuance of the EIS or ROD, or in 
the alternative, upon completion of any “final agency action”, including a 
FONSI, a challenge may be made in court pursuant to the APA.
28
 
C. The APA: A tool of process and procedure 
The Administrative Procedure Act was passed by Congress and signed 
into law by President Truman in June of 1946.
29
 According to the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the APA “governs the process by which 
federal agencies develop and issue regulations.”
30
 The APA allows claims 
by “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 
statute.”
31
 This Act lays out very clearly when judicial review of an agency 
                                                                                                             
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (West 2020).  
 23. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4332 (C), (D) (West 2020).  
 24. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(a). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 
519, 558 (1978). 
 27. See Lujan v. Nat. Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 at 882; See also Karst Envtl. Educ. 
and Prot., Inc. v. E.P.A., 475 F.3d 1291, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 28. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997); See also Sierra Club v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808, 813 (8th Cir. 2006).  
 29. Roni Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 
Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 207, 214 (2015). 
 30. Summary of the Administrative Procedure Act, https://www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-administrative-procedure-
act#:~:text=The%20Administrative%20Procedure%20Act%20(APA,on%20notices%20of%
20proposed%20rulemaking (last visited Feb. 12, 2021). 
 31. Norton, 542 U.S. 55 at 61. 
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action, when no other “private right of action,” is appropriate.
32
 Per the 
statutory language of the APA, “[a]gency action reviewable by statute and 
final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a court are 
subject to judicial review.”
33
 In that short phrase, Congress has directed that 
judicial review of agency action, under the APA, is only permissible when a 
final agency action has occurred. Under NEPA, “final agency action” is the 
issuance of an EIS, FEIS, FONSI, or a ROD.
34
 Through these limited 
options, a vast majority of courts have formally allowed relief under NEPA 
to individuals claiming to have suffered a legal wrong at the hands of a 
federal agency on environmental matters. The APA allows federal courts to 
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions”
35
 




III. Eighth Circuit precedent and limited judicial review 
The Eighth Circuit’s primary argument is very concise and well 
supported, but not without some flaws. The Eighth Circuit’s precedent has 
long been entwined with that of the Supreme Court and has held that 
NEPA, as a procedural law, is largely only challengeable under an APA 
claim made by individuals claiming a legal wrong.
37
 The APA makes it 
clear that courts only possess judicial review over “final agency action.”
38
 
Further, in order to hold an agency action unlawful or set it aside, the action 
must fall within one of the six “arbitrary and capricious” standards of 
review under the APA.
39
 Eighth Circuit precedent dates back prior to and 
including the 2006 case, Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
40
 
While discussing NEPA’s lack of express language providing for judicial 
review, the Sierra Club court continues the long-held view that unless 
express language within the statute provides substantive rights to 
individuals, procedural statutes, including NEPA, are only reviewable, 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. at 61–62. 
 33. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (West 2020). 
 34. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 529 at 527–28; See also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 at 813. 
 35. Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375–76 (1989). 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (West 2020).  
 37. See Marsh, 490 U.S. 360 at 375–76; See also Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 90 (1983).  
 38. Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d at 762 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704).  
 39. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (West 2020). 
 40. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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largely, under the APA’s framework.
41
 Supporting this, the Sierra Club 
court cites Bennett v. Spear,
42
 a 1997 Supreme Court case, which defined 
what constitutes a “final agency action”, per 5 U.S.C. § 704 of the APA, as 
applicable through NEPA. Under the APA framework, “final agency 
action” is determined to have occurred when “[f]irst, the action must mark 
the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process—it must not be 
of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature. And second, the action must 
be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which 
legal consequences will flow.”
43
  
The Eighth Circuit precedent also falls in line with the precedent 
established in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
44
 All three circuits stem their 
reasoning through the language of the APA and precedent established by 
the Supreme Court. This precedent stems back to Touche Ross & Co.
45
 and 
is further clarified in Alexander v. Sandoval.
46
 Touche held that “the 
ultimate question of [private causes of action] is one of Congressional 
intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the 
statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.”
47
 Alexander further held 
that “private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
Congress,” the judiciary must “interpret the statute Congress has passed in 
determining whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right 
but also a private remedy.”
48
  
Put plainly, the judiciary should not read additional content into statutes 
enacted by congress to allow for a private right of action or private remedy 
when Congress has explicitly left one out of the legislation. The Eighth 
Circuit has held repeatedly that NEPA’s text does not provide for any right 
of action.
49
 Since there is no private right of action following from NEPA’s 
procedural nature, under the APA, judicial review is limited strictly to 
“review of final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. at 813. 
 42. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997).  
 43. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 at 813. 
 44. Noe v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 1981); E.g., 
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. U.S., 417 F.3d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 45. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
 46. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).  
 47. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578.  
 48. Alexander, 532 U.S. 275 at 286 (2001); See Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d 759 at 762. 
 49. Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d at 762; See E.g., Sierra Club v. Kimball, 623 F.3d 549, 
558–59 (8th Cir. 2010). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/6





 This logical procession based upon Supreme Court precedent 
and founded in the APA’s treatment of review in procedural matters leads 
to the conclusion given in the LPA case. NEPA compliance is a procedural 
matter. There was no signal given in the statutory text that “Congress 
sought ‘to provide a remedy for private individuals who may be injured by 
a violation of NEPA.’”
51
 By tracing the Eighth Circuit’s precedent not only 
through the very statutory language of NEPA and the APA, but to 
precedent of other circuits, and finally to Supreme Court holdings, the 
Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is quite strong in NEPA cases. Albeit it does not 
leave much room for instances where federal agencies abuse their discretion 
in a manner that does not rise to the high “arbitrary and capricious”
52
 
standard needed for a court to overturn agency action. 
IV. Fourth Circuit precedent, A glimmer of hope for private challenges 
Opposing the Eighth Circuit’s majority view that judicial review of 
agency action under NEPA is only appropriate through the APA when there 
is a “final agency action,” is that of the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit 
does agree however with one aspect of the majority view, that neither 
NEPA (nor the APA) “in its [text] provides a cause of action against state 
actors.”
53
 However, the Fourth Circuit through the application of a form of 
“Pendent Jurisdiction” on claims against state actors will allow private 
claims to proceed without final agency action having occurred.
54
 Dating 
back to 1972, in Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, the Fourth Circuit 
has held: 
that federal courts have ‘a form of pendent jurisdiction . . . based 
upon necessity’ over claims for injunctive relief brought against 
state actors in order to preserve the integrity of federal 
remedies . . .. Where ‘the challenged activities’ of state actors 
‘would make a sham of the reconsideration required by federal 
law,’ federal courts may entertain suits against state actors ‘to 
                                                                                                             
 50. Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d at 762; See E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 at 813. 
 51. Noe v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 1981); See 
E.g., Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d at 762. 
 52. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (West 2020). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Limehouse, 549 F.3d at 330.  
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This form of “pendent jurisdiction” has been utilized in Fourth Circuit 
cases regarding NEPA, creating circuit precedent, where ‘there is standing 
to preserve the environmental status quo pending federal review.”
56
 The 
Circuit has held “that NEPA does provide a cause of action for private 
plaintiffs challenging compliance with its provisions. The federal statute 
and our precedent permit suit against a state actor where a party seeks to 
preserve federal rights . . . pending the outcome of federal procedural 
review.”
57
 Although there is precedent to allow private actions under non-
final agency action to preserve a “status quo” of the environment, the 
precedent of this “status quo” component deserves further exploration.  
Only two cases were located in the Fourth Circuit mentioning 
“environmental status quo.” The Limehouse case, and a U.S. District Court 
case, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. U.S. Army Corps. Of 
Engineers.
58
 The Limehouse case utilized two cases to support its finding 
that injunctive relief was plausible under NEPA to “preserve the 
environmental status quo.”  
First, the Limehouse court referred to Ely v. Velde,
59
 a Fourth Circuit 
decision from 1974. Although this case did discuss NEPA’s process and 
application, the court ultimately did not opt to enjoin the parties from 
continued action, it instead opted to allow the state to proceed with 
construction of their project without the use of federal funds, by utilizing 
state funds solely for the project, or if states opted to continue diversion of 
federal funds to other projects, they would need to return federal funds as 
opposed to retaining them.
60
 Only in the instance where the state declines 
the recommended actions of the Fourth Circuit regarding the federal funds, 
should the district court enjoin the construction project as it violates both 
NEPA and other Acts.
61
 There was no mention in Ely of protection of the 
environment per se prior to final agency action or preservation of a “status 
quo”, but rather a state’s options to either proceed under NEPA standards 
                                                                                                             
 55. Id. (quoting Arlington Coal. On Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323, 1329 (4th Cir. 
1972). 
 56. Limehouse, 549 F.3d at 330. 
 57. Id. at 331.  
 58. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 3:05-0784, Slip op. 
9717766 (S.D.W.V. Apr. 20, 2007).  
 59. Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252, 257 (4th Cir. 1974).  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/6
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and other requirements of statutory acts to utilize federal funds or utilize 
state funds as the sole means of construction of a penal facility. Only in the 
absence of the state choosing one of the court’s provided options, would an 
injunction be necessary. This case centered almost solely upon the funding 
context of a state project.  
The Limehouse court then refers to a Ninth Circuit decision from 1976, 
Sierra Club v. Hodel.
62
 Hodel centered primarily around a state agency’s 
failure to complete an EIS following its entrance into a contract which 
could be constituted as a “major federal action”, requiring completion of an 
EIS under NEPA.
63
 Hodel appears more on point with the concept of 
“preserving the environmental status quo”, as an injunction under NEPA 
was ordered.
64
 However, there are significant differences as Hodel centers 
around a state actor failing to perform an EIS in compliance with NEPA 
standards. With no EIS completed, there naturally was no ROD issued by 
any federal agency. In instances where there is no compliance or inadequate 
compliance with NEPA’s procedures and no showing of any of the 
“arbitrary and capricious” standards of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), the courts have 
overwhelmingly either (1) remanded cases back to a lower court for further 
deliberation on compliance with NEPA’s procedures as appropriate, 
whether by issuing an EA, EIS, or other “final agency action”,
65
 or (2) 
determined that the “agency action” was adequate under NEPA or did not 
fall under NEPA’s subject matter.
66
  
Although not discussed in the Limehouse case, but arguably more 
convincing of the plausibility of injunctive relief in NEPA cases, is the 
second case located in the Fourth Circuit to mention “environmental status 
quo”; Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition case.
67
 In discussing the 
concept of “environmental status quo”, the Fourth Circuit discusses its 
origin stemming from Amoco Productions, a 1987 Supreme Court Case, 
which very briefly touched upon a NEPA matter. In Amoco Productions, 
the Court, while discussing the plausibility of injunctive relief in 
environmental matters, held that “[e]nvironmental injury, by its nature, can 
                                                                                                             
 62. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 63. Id. at 1037–38. 
 64. Id. at 1038. 
 65. See Kern v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 284 F.3d 1062, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002); See also 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 20-5197, 2021 WL 244862, at 
*14 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 26, 2021). 
 66. See Marsh, 490 U.S. 360 at 385; See also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 
U.S. 7, 30–33 (2008). 
 67. Ohio Valley, Slip op. 9717766. 
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seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often permanent 
or at least of long duration, i.e., irreparable. If such injury is sufficiently 
likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an 
injunction to protect the environment.”
68
 Although the Amoco case centered 
on private individuals seeking an injunction to prevent a corporation which 
held leases to drill for oil and gas on the Alaskan coast,
69
 the rationale falls 
in line with the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Limehouse. To provide 
potential injunctive relief, even if only temporary, and to prevent any undue 
loss of the very thing at the core of NEPA’s purpose, the environment. By 
allowing the judiciary to provide equitable relief to individual plaintiff’s 
claiming to have been harmed by the actions of a federal agency, the Fourth 
Circuit’s precedent ensures that, in the aggregate, no adverse effects occur 
to the environment before a final agency action can occur in accordance 
with NEPA’s process. Unfortunately, aside from the dicta of the Amoco 
case, there is little to no strong evidence supporting the Fourth Circuit’s 
“pendent jurisdiction” in the face of other Supreme Court opinions and a 
vast majority of the other circuits agreeing that, as a procedural law, NEPA 
does not by itself afford a private right of action to individuals. Further, 
even through an APA claim, pursuant to the statutory language, judicial 
review is only appropriate following “final agency action”.
 70
 Following this 
process, however, there are only limited circumstances which a court may 
overrule a federal agency’s decision.
71
  
V. Lakes and Parks Alliance: Groundbreaking or treading 
in the water of precedent? 
 Over the half-century since the passage of NEPA, a split developed 
throughout the circuit courts, specifically the Eighth Circuit and the Fourth 
Circuit. This split encompasses the issue of what actions may the judiciary 
take regarding agency action, specifically, action taken regarding NEPA. 
While it is settled that NEPA is a procedural law,
72
 there remains a rift as to 
what judicial relief private parties may seek following a claimed violation 
of NEPA. The Fourth Circuit follows circuit precedent that “NEPA does 
provide a cause of action for private plaintiffs challenging compliance with 
                                                                                                             
 68. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S. 531 (1987).  
 69. Id. at 539–40. 
 70. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 529 at 527–28; See also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 at 813. 
 71. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (West 2020). 
 72. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558.  
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 Opposing this view, Eighth Circuit case precedent dictates 
that “jurisdiction is limited to judicial review under the [APA], which 
provides for review of final agency action for which there is no adequate 
remedy in court . . . [e]specially when the only defendant is a state 
agency.”
74
 This long-standing split has led to one of the most recent NEPA 
decisions, in 2019. We begin by discussing the background and facts of the 
Lakes and Parks case.  
In the fall of 2008, the Metropolitan Council (“the Council”), a regional 
transportation agency of the State of Minnesota, initiated plans to construct 
the Southwestern Light Rail Transit Project (“SWLRT”).
75
 The rail was to 
run from downtown Minneapolis to the southwestern Twin Cities suburbs, 
connecting the two.
76
 Due to partial funding through the Federal Transit 
Administration (“FTA”), the Council was required to have environmental 
review of the SWLRT.
77
 These regulations required the FTA to craft an EIS 
accounting for “major Federal actions significantly effecting the quality of 
the human environment.”
78
 Upon successful completion of the EIS, the 





 “the Council [was required] to seek the approval of 
each city and county along the SWLRT’s proposed route before continuing 
construction.”
81
 By the time 2014 came around, the Council was initiating 




The Lakes and Parks Alliance of Minneapolis, is a nonprofit organization 
of residents in and around Minneapolis and the greater Twin Cities, 
including Kenilworth Corridor where the rail was scheduled to run.
83
 
Coinciding with the Council’s municipal consent stage to construct the 
SWLRT, the LPA began to claim that the Council’s review process for the 
rail was not in compliance with state or federal law.
84
 In September of 
2014, the LPA initiated their lawsuit against the Council and the FTA 
                                                                                                             
 73. Limehouse, 549 F.3d at 331. 
 74. Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d 759 at 762. 
 75. Id. at 761. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Minn. Stat. § 473.3994, subs. 2-3 (2020).  
 81. Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d at 761. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. at 761–62.  
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alleging violations of NEPA, the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act, and 
the Minnesota municipal consent statutes.
85
 This case was initiated prior to 
the issuance of an EIS, let alone an ROD through the FTA.
86
 Despite the 
district court’s dismissal of a majority of the LPA’s claims, the district 
court denied the Council’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in 
order to “preserve a ‘narrow’ cause of action under NEPA to prevent the 
Council from taking action that could ‘eviscerate’ any federal remedy later 
available to the LPA.”
87
  
Ultimately, the district court granted the Council’s motion for summary 
judgement.
88
 Additionally, the district court granted the FTA’s motion for 
summary judgement finding that “sovereign immunity barred the LPA’s 
claim against the federal government.”
89
 The LPA appealed the summary 
judgement decision, maintaining their original claim, that the Council had 
violated NEPA and other federal laws. The Council cross-appealed on the 
decision of the district court to dismiss their motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction.
90
 The question posed to the Eighth Circuit was relatively 
straightforward. Can courts review an agency action under the National 
Environmental Policy Act? 
The Eighth Circuit answered this in the negative; at least in this case, 
ultimately reversing and remanding the case for dismissal on the Council’s 
motion for lack of jurisdiction.
91
 Because the FTA’s motion to dismiss was 
granted by the district court based on “sovereign immunity”, there no 
longer was a federal agency tied to the action, making a NEPA claim 
impracticable.
92
 The Eighth Circuit found that the district court incorrectly 
applied Fourth Circuit precedent, based on Limehouse,
93
 allowing for a 
cause of action without a federal agency present in the case. This was in 
direct opposition to Eighth Circuit precedent, which dictated when judicial 
review may be available.
94
 Furthermore, the Council released the final EIS 
in May of 2016 and the FTA issued a ROD just two months later, in July 
2016.
95
 Therefore, the circuit court reversed and remanded the case 
                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 761.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (citation omitted). 
 88. Id. at 760–61. 
 89. Id. at 761.  
 90. Id. at 760–61.  
 91. Id. at 763.  
 92. Id. at 761. 
 93. Limehouse, 549 F.3d 324. 
 94. Lakes and Parks, 928 F.3d at 762.  
 95. Id. at 761. 
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directing that there was “no live controversy for the court to resolve,” since 
the EIC process had been completed and a final ROD had been issued. This 
ultimately stripped the court of jurisdiction over the matter.
96
 
Aside from precedent, the court also dove into independent 
considerations and issues present in the LPA’s suit and in the LPA’s 
reliance on the Fourth Circuit’s holding in the Limehouse case. In 
Limehouse, the Fourth Circuit followed widespread precedent closely, that 
under NEPA there is no judicial review of agency action unless there had 
been final action performed. In Limehouse; not only had there been a final 
EIS issued, but also a ROD by the federal agency involved.
97
 This differed 
drastically from the LPA case which, as mentioned above, did not have an 
EIS or a ROD issued prior to the case being filed.
98
 Additionally, there was 
the striking difference that in Limehouse there was still a federal agency, 
the Federal Highway Administration, as a party to the case.
99
 In LPA 
however, there was no federal agency still attached to the case as a party 
following the district court’s granting of the FTA’s Motion to Dismiss due 
to sovereign immunity grounds.
100
 Lastly, due to the LPA’s failure to 
appropriately challenge the dismissal of the FTA from the case alongside 
premature filing prior to a “final agency action,” there was no available 
challenge to the FTA’s issuance of a ROD. This ultimately left the action 
moot and no longer a “live” issue for the court to resolve, prompting lack of 
jurisdiction in the matter.
101
 
VI. The Other Eleven: Falling in line or setting trends? 
Naturally, the Eighth and Fourth Circuits are not the only circuits hearing 
challenges under NEPA. While tracing the reasoning behind the Fourth and 
Eighth Circuits, differing as they do, on claims involving NEPA; it may 
prove helpful to evaluate if the same standards are maintained in cases 
involving similar matters throughout the other eleven circuits. To work 
through this, each circuit’s precedent will be examined. In other words, do 
the various circuits predominately follow the Eighth Circuit, allowing for 
“limited judicial review under the [APA] . . . ‘of final agency action for 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. at 763. 
 97. Id. at 762. 
 98. Id. at 761. 
 99. Limehouse, 549 F.3d at 328. 
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 101. Id. at 763. 
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which there is no other adequate remedy in court,’”
102
 or do they tend to 
follow the Fourth Circuit, which has allowed judicial relief for claimants to 




A. First Circuit 
The First Circuit applies APA procedures to NEPA cases, in particular in 
instances where agency decisions are found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
104
 Going 
further, they have also followed the guidance set out by the Supreme Court 
that “NEPA’s requirements are procedural in nature.”
105
 The only role of 
judicial review in NEPA cases is to “insure that the agency has taken a hard 
look at environment consequences.”
106
 Holding a similar view as other 
circuits, “NEPA provides no private right of action at all.”
107
 
B. Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit follows the guiding principle that NEPA “does not 
itself provide for judicial review, [and such] the [APA] controls.”
108
 As a 
“procedural statute”, NEPA has only limited areas for judicial review under 
the APA; namely for determining if an agency’s actions are “arbitrary, 




C. Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit has held that NEPA “does not include a citizen’s suit 
provision” (i.e. a private right of action).
110
 Therefore, any claims must be 
applied under the APA judicial review standard which is appropriate only 
following final agency actions.
111
 Additionally, “NEPA is a procedural 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. at 762. 
 103. Limehouse, 549 F.3d at 330. 
 104. Massachusetts v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 708 F.3d 63, 73 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 
 105. U.S. v. Coal. for Buzzard’s Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 31(1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Dep’t of 
Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004)). 
 106. U.S. v. Coalition for Buzzard’s Bay, 644 F.3d 26, 31(1st Cir. 2011). 
 107. Town of Portsmouth, R.I. v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 108. Friends of Animals v. Romero, 948 F.3d 579, 585 (2nd Cir. 2020).  
 109. Id.  
 110. Maiden Creek Assocs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 823 F.3d 184, 189 (3rd Cir. 2016). 
 111. Tinicum Twp., Pa. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 685 F.3d 288, 294 (3rd Cir. 2012). 
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statute that does not mandate particular substantive results.”
112
 All that is 
guaranteed under NEPA is the “necessary process the [federal] agency must 




D. Fifth Circuit 
Likewise, the Fifth Circuit reads NEPA as a procedural statute, which at 
its core, “requires certain steps [be taken] before federal agencies may 
approve projects that will affect the environment.”
114
 The Circuit has also 




E. Sixth Circuit 
Like the other circuits, the Sixth Circuit abides by the principle that 
NEPA does not provide for a private right of action, however the APA 
provides for judicial review.
116
 This right to judicial review only begins 
once final action is taken by the agency.
117
 The Sixth Circuit agrees with 
the view of other circuits that “final agency action” exists when a “final EIS 
or the ROD is issued”
118
 
F. Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit utilizes the APA framework to govern its review of 
agency action.
119
 Under the APA framework, as with other circuits, the 
rather narrowly framed, standard question to ask is “whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has 
been a clear error of judgement.”
120
 Although the agencies carry the 
obligation of undergoing “weighing of substantive environmental goals,” it 
is the judiciary’s role to review and uphold the “procedural” nature of 
NEPA.
121
 Due to NEPA’s procedural nature, “agencies may decide to 
                                                                                                             
 112. Id.  
 113. Maiden Creek Assocs., 823 F.3d at 190. 
 114. Atchafalaya Basinkeeper v. U.S. Army Corps. Of Eng’rs, 894 F.3d 692, 695 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
 115. Id. at 696.  
 116. Sierra Club v. Slater, 120 F.3d 623, 630–31 (6th Cir. 1997).  
 117. Id. at 631. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Highway J Citizens Grp. v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938, 952 (7th Cir. 2003).  
 120. Highway J Citizens Grp. v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938, 952 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Marsh, 490 U.S. 360 at 378). 
 121. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1984).  
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subordinate environmental values to other social values with which they 
sometimes compete.”
122
 In other words, should the social values of an 
agency’s action cross the values held by NEPA to protect the environment, 
the agency may show preference to abide by the social values.  
G. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit follows the principle that NEPA violations are 
reviewable largely only under the APA and that agency decisions may only 
be set aside if “they are ‘arbitrary, capricious an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.’”
123
 The Ninth Circuit and other 
circuits have long followed that due to NEPA’s procedural nature, it “exists 
to ensure a process, not to ensure any result.”
124
 NEPA’s goals are met once 
“(1) [the agency] ensure[s that] the[y] will have detailed information on 
significant environmental impacts when it makes its decisions; and (2) [the 




The Ninth Circuit does not fully shut the door on injunctive relief. They 
quote the Supreme Court case Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
AK,
126
 in which the Court discussed injunctive relief regarding 
environmental cases. Findings of “irreparable injury” to the environment 
does not automatically call of an injunction, instead it merely adds to the 
“balancing of harm” in favor of an injunction.
127
 
H. Tenth Circuit 
Per the Tenth Circuit, “NEPA requires no substantive result . . . [it] 
imposes procedural, information-gathering requirements on an agency, but 
is silent about the course of action the agency should take. . . . [it] merely 




                                                                                                             
 122. Id. at 426.  
 123. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Sherman, 646 F.3d 1161, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 124. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 
1996) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)). 
 125. Inland Empire Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 
1996). 
 126. Amoco Prod., 480 U.S. 531 at 542. 
 127. High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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1166 (10th Cir. 2012).  
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I. Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit agrees that “NEPA only requires that an agency 
follow [ ] procedure; it does not mandate any particular result.”
129
 As a 
purely procedural Act, NEPA “set[s] forth no substantive limits on agency 
decision-making.”
130
 The Eleventh Circuit also utilized the APA and its 
ability to allow court’s jurisdiction to hear cases and provide “judicial 
review of federal agency action” and “all [ ] courts to enjoin authorities of 
the United States government.”
131
 
J. D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit emphasizes the “well-established” principle that 
“NEPA imposes only procedural requirements on federal agencies with a 
particular focus on requiring agencies to undertake analysis of the 
environmental impact of their proposals and actions.”
132
 These procedural 
requirements “simply [ ] ensure that the agency has adequately considered 
and disclosed the environmental impacts of its actions.”
133
 
K. Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit has not heard many NEPA challenges, and further, 
has heard even fewer which would allow the circuit to provide as robust of 
a discussion on judicial review as other circuits have. One such case did 




VII. Did Lakes and Parks get it right or did they get it wrong? 
After evaluating the statutory language of NEPA and the APA alongside 
precedent within both the Eighth Circuit and Fourth Circuit, and the vast 
majority of the other circuits including the Supreme Court; the LPA court 
and Eighth Circuit precedent is by all indications, fairly correct.  
                                                                                                             
 129. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008).  
 130. Id. at 1361.  
 131. Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 669 F.3d 1203, 1210 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
 132. Indian River County, Fla. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 945 F.3d 515, 522 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
 133. Id. at 523. 
 134. Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. v. United States, 972 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2020).  
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Prior to the 2019 LPA holding, the Eighth Circuit, held that in 
accordance with the APA, “NEPA does not provide a private right of 
action, the APA [however] permits judicial review of [final] 
agency action . . ..”
135
 The vast majority of other circuits have similarly held 
that no private remedy exists under NEPA. For example, the Fifth Circuit 
held that “NEPA provides procedural rather than substantive protection,” 
which acts as proof that Congress was not seeking “to provide a remedy for 
private individuals who may be injured by a violation of NEPA.”
136
 The 
Ninth Circuit mirrored this by stating; “[a] fundamental and oft-quoted 
principle of environmental law is that there is no private right of action 
under NEPA.”
137
 Acting as the backbone for these circuit determinations, 
the Supreme Court has long held that NEPA does not set out any 
substantive goals but rather is a procedural mandate to the various federal 
agencies.
138
 Although the majority have interpreted this to mean NEPA is 
purely procedural, one minority circuit views an exception to the rule. 
This minority consists of the Fourth Circuit, which has held that “NEPA 
does provide a cause of action for private plaintiffs challenging compliance 
with its provisions.”
139
 Although NEPA and the APA do not explicitly 
provide for a cause of action against state actors, the Fourth Circuit has held 
that “federal courts have ‘a form of pendent jurisdiction . . . based upon 
necessity’ over claims for injunctive relief brought against state actors in 
order to preserve the integrity of federal remedies.”
140
 This is specifically 
applicable in situations “[w]here ‘the challenged activities’ of state actors 
‘would make a sham of the reconsideration required by federal law,’ federal 
courts may entertain suits against state actors ‘to preserve federal question 
jurisdiction in the application of federal statutes.’”
141
 This precedent dates 
back to 1972 in Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, in which the 
Fourth Circuit initially decided that this form of “pendent jurisdiction” was 
necessary in state actions “to preserve federal question jurisdiction in the 
application of federal statutes.”
142
  
                                                                                                             
 135. Sierra Club v. Kimbell, 623 F.3d 549 (8th Cir 2010); E.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808 at 813. 
 136. Noe, 644 F.2d 434 at 438. 
 137. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 417 F.3d 1091 at 1097.  
 138. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 at 558. 
 139. Limehouse, 549 F.3d at 331. 
 140. Id. at 330 (citation omitted). 
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This continued in the Maryland Conservation Council case, which held 
that non-federal projects are considered a ‘“federal action’ if they cannot 
‘begin or continue without prior approval of a federal agency.’”
143
 Since the 
project in the Maryland Conservation Council case (i.e. a public highway) 
required federal approval to cross federally allocated land, approval was 
necessary.
144
 This necessity of federal approval is what prompted the Fourth 
Circuit to provide private individuals a cause of action challenging 
compliance with NEPA’s provisions.
145
 The differing precedents of the 
Eighth and Fourth Circuits have created a split as to what remedies the 
judiciary may provide regarding agency action in NEPA cases. The 
Supreme Court has been somewhat silent on this matter, except for an 
illusory mention in a 1975 case,
146
 and as noted above in Vermont Yankee, 
that “NEPA . . . set[s] forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but 
its mandate is essentially procedural.”
147
  
Since the conflicting opinions center on Fourth and Eighth Circuit 
precedents, they must be evaluated independently. However, there are a few 
standard commonalities which need to be discussed. First, per guidance 
from the Supreme Court, NEPA is a procedural law.
148
 Second, as a 
procedural law, the APA dictates if and when judicial review is appropriate. 
Per the APA, judicial review of agency action is only available when there 
is “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a 
court.”
149
 To evaluate if an agency action is “final”, the Supreme Court has 
established a test.  
First, the action must mark the consummation of the agency's 
decision-making process—it must not be of a merely tentative or 
interlocutory nature. And second, the action must be one by 
which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which 
legal consequences will flow.
150
 
                                                                                                             
 143. Maryland Conservation Council, Inc v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039, 1042 (4th Cir. 
1986). (citation omitted from 2d Cir. and D.C. Cir.). 
 144. Maryland Conservation Council, Inc v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039, 1042 (4th Cir. 
1986). 
 145. Id.  
 146. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures, 422 U.S. 289, 318–19 (1975). 
 147. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558. 
 148. Id. at 558. 
 149. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (West 2020). 
 150. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997); Accord Hawkes Co. v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 782 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 2015).  
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Using this test, the Eighth and Fourth Circuits agree that in NEPA cases 
issuance of a ROD by a federal agency is a “final agency action” of which 
judicial review may stem under the APA.
151
 
One factor which weighed heavily in how the Eighth Circuit held in the 
LPA case was the fact that the FTA had been dismissed from the case per 
their motion to the trial court, therefore leaving only state level entities as 
defendants.
152
 This is what ultimately led to the circuit’s reverse and 
remand of the case for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
153
 
Despite this portion of the case, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is strong, 
stemming from not only its own precedent, but more specifically guidance 
from the Supreme Court that NEPA is a procedural law. When evaluating a 
procedural law which lacks substantive rights to private individuals, the 
only remedy created by Congress for an agency’s actions, lies in the APA. 
The circuit further utilizes the statutory text of the APA which dictates that 
judicial review is only possible following “final agency action”. In the case 
of NEPA, a ROD from a federal agency is a “final agency action” alongside 
a few other decisions not at play in the Lakes and Parks case. Since the 
LPA filed suit prior to the issuance of a ROD, and in conjunction with the 
EIS still being formulated, the judiciary had no formal stance to provide 
judiciary review over the federal agencies action. Additionally, since the 
Eighth Circuit does not practice the same “pendent jurisdiction” as the 
Fourth Circuit, there is no standing since the FTA was dismissed as a party 
by the district court. Aside from all the outlier facts that made the LPA 
ultimately lose their case, their failure to act at the appropriate time (i.e., 
after the issuance of a “final agency action”) is what led to their demise.  
Although not the most logical when compared with the precedent of the 
Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit did make some good points and I agree 
with the need for a form of injunctive relief in certain situations, until a 
final agency action occurs, to preserve the “environmental status quo”. 
However, the reasoning behind the Circuit’s precedent of injunctive relief 
does not quite weigh as strongly as the Eighth Circuit’s concise and well 
supported reasoning. Upon further review of the six “arbitrary and 
capricious” standards listed in the APA,
154
 and their application throughout 
the various circuits, it is a high bar for plaintiffs to meet. For example, In 
State of Wisconsin v. Weinberger, a 7
th
 Circuit case, the court was left 
                                                                                                             
 151. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808; See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y 
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performing balancing of interests test.
155
 Ultimately, when faced with 
complying with NEPA’s procedure and the possible harm to “national 
defense,” the Navy’s actions were found to not rise to the level of judicial 
intervention.
156
 Until there is a new statute adopted or NEPA is expressly 
given some form of substantive right to private action, it is difficult to say 
whether the procedural act is making a meaningful impact on the 
environment, outside of simply alerting the masses to the potential harm 
being done in the name of our own national welfare.  
Lastly, weighing in on the overall accuracy of the Eighth Circuit, many 
of the cases located and cited within this note consisted of claims under not 
only NEPA, as applied through the APA, but alongside other statutory acts 
such as the Stafford Act or the Clean Water Act, to name a few.
157
 Some of 
these acts provide rights for private individuals to either appeal the federal 
agency’s decision or provide some other substantive right of action. 
Unfortunately, due to NEPA’s very purpose boiling down to a procedure of 
weighing effects on the environment and considering alternative courses of 
action, NEPA claims brought alone and applied through the APA are rather 
weak if a federal agency has done the very minimum effort involved in 
drafting an EA or an EIS. In terms of the LPA case, the Council, by all 
indication, was following NEPA and preparing a detailed EIS and 
ultimately obtained a ROD through the FTA. This met the loose standards 
that exist under the National Environmental Policy Act. Thus, under the 
widely accepted standard of review under NEPA, courts may not openly 
review agency actions. They may only do so following a “final agency 
action”. Ultimately, the Lakes and Parks Association brought their case too 
early to win and did not have a federal agency tied to their appeal.  
VIII. Conclusion 
Given that the LPA court not only followed circuit precedent but also the 
overwhelming evidence that the Eighth Circuit’s precedent falls largely in 
line with the vast majority of other circuits, the LPA court decided the case 
correctly. Without the explicit authorization of Congress for individuals 
affected by the actions of a federal agency to have a private cause of action 
under NEPA, the only fallback is with an APA claim. To have an APA 
claim, however, hopeful plaintiffs need to overcome one small hurdle; a 
                                                                                                             
 155. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 at 426–28.  
 156. Id.  
 157. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 446 F.3d 808; See also Sierra Club v. 
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“final agency action” must have occurred for an action to stand up in court. 
Although the effort was admirable, and there may well have been proof that 
the Council was attempting to skirt requirements to properly evaluate 
alternatives for the Southwestern Light Rail Transit Project, NEPA was not 
the most optimal claim to combat the Council or the SWLRT’s route 
through the area known as the Kenilworth Corridor.  
Given that NEPA is merely a procedural law which dictates that federal 
agencies take a “hard look” at the effects of their actions upon the human 
environment while evaluating viable alternatives, there appears to be no 
bite behind the statute for those who depart from its guidelines. In a vast 
number of NEPA cases where courts have held that agencies have not 
followed the procedures closely enough, the courts have simply ordered the 
agency to either proceed with the EIS process or allowed “other interests” 
to dominate NEPA. There is no substantive action which can be taken 
except for ensuring the agencies follow procedures, as they are written, and 
“to assess the environmental effects of their proposed actions prior to 
making decisions.”
158
 This is one of the most common reasons that NEPA 
claims are so often tied into cases dealing with other statutory acts such as 
the Clean Water Act which often have substantive rights of private action 
expressly built into them. Unfortunately for the Lakes and Parks Alliance of 
Minneapolis, there was no applicable law present or plainly visible to file 
claims on regarding the rail plan through the Kenilworth Corridor. Given 
the current state of NEPA and gap of substantive law to preserve land such 
as the Kenilworth Corridor, the judiciary has little to no ground to stand 
upon in issuing injunctive relief prior to any final agency action having 
been issued. It is for these reasons that despite the admirability of the 
Limehouse court and the Fourth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit’s holding is 
ultimately correct. 
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